92-1117

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No. _____

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

FRANCES M. HALL, ET AL.

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN E. CONWAY, ET AL.

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

* * * *

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

* * * *

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64 pp

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:

I. Is Petitioner Hall entitled to absolute immunity because those statements that the Respondents complain about in this case are affidavits written in Camoscio vs. Conway ?

II. Did the court err by not granting summary judgment since Hall proved that it was the Respondents who circulated the statements that allegedly interfered with the sale of the property to the Mendoncas, but according to affidavits it was Douglas Purdy, Conways' employee, who circulated these statements, not the Petitioners as alleged in the complaint and because the Respondents could not cite one false statement made by the Petitioner, thus violating Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231 § 91 ?

III. Did the court violate Petitioner Hall's right of due process by denying her the right to be heard in a meaningful manner because Judge Mathers refused to postpone the trial because of Hall's physical condition nor did he make any arrangements making it physically possible for Hall to testify and participate in her own defense, even if she had testified, her rights of due process would have been violated because she was on class II and class III narcotics, and also the judge refused to enforce key subpoenas of Patricia Conway who was the accuser and the Mendoncas whom the Respondents claimed withdrew their offer to buy property because of statements the Respondents alleged were circulated by the Petitioners ?

IV. Does the court have the power

to enforce judgment if proofs exist that fraud was committed since Rule 9 of Civil Procedures of both the State and Federal Rules prevent the court from enforcing judgment when fraud has occurred.

PARTIES TO THE CASE

FRANCES M. HALL,

Petitioner,

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO,

Co-Defendant in Original Case.

vs.

JOHN E. CONWAY,

Respondent,

and PATRICIA A. CONWAY,

Respondent.

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OPINION BELOW

This case was tried before a jury who came down with their decision against the Petitioner and Co-Defendant for $42,500 on January 25, 1991.
See Appendix A beginning on page A1.

The Petitioner filed an appeal with the Appeals Court which was denied on January 31, 1992.
See Appendix B beginning on page B1.

The Petitioner filed for Further Appellate Review which was denied by the court on February 26, 1992.
See Appendix C beginning on page C1.

The Petitioner could not file a Writ of Certiorari in Washington until the Superior Court acted on Camoscio's Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud. Judge Mather's was so embarrassed by the truth of this motion that he ordered it stricken from the record

and placed a gag order in place to prevent the truth from being known.
See Appendix D beginning on page D1.

Co-Defendant Camoscio then filed a similar motion with the Appeals Court which accepted all proofs and arguments but denied the motion on July 9, 1992.
See Appendix E beginning on page E1.

The Petitioner tried to file a Writ of Certiorari in Washington because the Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts do not apply to Frank J. Camoscio a party to this case. The Court wrote an order in a past case baring Camoscio from filing with that court unless the Justices voted to accept filing. The Supreme Court of the United States returned the briefs and appendix stating that the highest Court of the State must rule first. On October 20, 1992 the justices voted not to accept Frank

J. Camoscio's filing for a Petition of Equity if granted would have set aside judgment.

JURISDICTION

The last judgment was entered by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts on July 9, 1992. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Rule 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and 28 U.S. C.A. § 1257.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts voted not to review the Petitioners Petition for Equity on October 20, 1992.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 to the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:

> "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws".

The petitioner also states that M.G.L. chapter 231 § 91 is the central issue in this case. This law is found in Appendix F, beginning on page F1.

The petitioner also cites Rule 9(b) and Rule 9(e) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure as grounds to

set aside judgment found in Appendix F.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, Frances M. Hall was sued by the Respondents as a co-defendant with Frank J. Camoscio for contractural interference.

The Petitioner was not part of the original court case filed by Frank J. Camoscio against the Respondents. The Petitioner however wrote several affidavits outlining her sale of the property to Camoscio as part of her Probate Court action. The Petitioner was paid in full by Camoscio for her half of the property.
See Appendix G.

The Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss because the Respondent's were suing her solely on the affidavits that she had written for Camoscio. Under Massachusetts Law, Massachusetts General Laws chapter

231 § 91 the Respondents cannot collect for damages arising out of truthful statements. The Petitioner is also protected by immunity because these statements were made in a legal court document.

During these proceedings the Petitioner was denied the right of Discovery by Judge Prince. The Petitioner objected to this at a hearing.

The Petitioner was involved in a car accident going to a hearing at the Brockton Court House involving this case. Due to the severity of this accident the Petitioner was bed ridden for many months due to failed bone transplants and grafts.

The Petitioner hired an attorney, Americo Ferullo to represent her at the trial. The trial was scheduled in August of 1990 but this trial was postponed due to the judges inability to

address all the motions pending and the Respondent Patricia A. Conway to be present.

In January of 1991 the Court sent out notices for a Status Hearing. The Petitioner had Frank J. Camoscio deliver notice to the Court that Frances M. Hall was to ill to attend any trial for at least 60 days and asked the Court to not hold any trial until she was physically and mentally able to attend. Her attorney could not attend this hearing because of his alleged busy schedule.

Judge Steadman hearing the matter marked up this case for immediate trial.

Camoscio argued that he needed time to subpoena witnesses for the trial and the Court granted him only 6 days in which to prepare for trial and send subpoenas, and three of these days

was a national holiday weekend. The Court knew that the witnesses involved lived in several different counties making it nearly impossible to have them served on time.

The Petitioner's attorney filed a motion for an extension of time for 60 days because of his clients condition and her inability to testify. A doctor's letter was given to the Court stating that she could only be out of bed for a 2 hour period and was not allowed tc leave her home to travel. Please see Appendix "H" Dr. Michael A. Drew's letter to the Court.
The Petitioner lived over one hours drive away from the Court house in Brockton and was on Class 2 and Class 3 drugs which mentally impaired her ability to think and to remember. The Petitioner was a recent recipient of a bone graft operation which was the

reason for her confinement to complete bed rest.

At the first day of the trial on January 22, 1991 Petitioner Hall received a phone call at approximately 11:45 a.m. from attorney Ferullo that the jury had already been picked and that she was going to lose the case. He wanted to know if she wanted to work a deal to cut her losses, and the Conways withdraw her from the case.

The Petitioner told her attorney that she wanted to testify and tell the jury about all the wrong doings that had happened to her in Probate Court. She wanted to tell the jury about the fraud and the tampering of the mails by her ex-husband and how her ex-husband and her original lawyer in the divorce proceedings lived together after this lawyer was disbarred for bank embezzling.

Later, Petitioner Hall talked to Camoscio and learned that the jury had not been impaneled until after 2 p.m. on January 22, 1991. She also learned that attorney Ferullo wanted to withdraw from the case when he found out that Judge Lawton was a potential witness. Attorney Ferullo and Judge Lawton were friends and socialized together. After the first day of the trial, Petitioner Hall never heard from her attorney again until he sent her notification by a constable on January 31, 1991 about the loss of the case.

Petitioner Hall wanted to be a witness at this trial and informed her attorney because she knew that once any jury heard the truth, they would find in the Petitioners' favor. However, attorney Ferullo never contacted Frances Hall nor made any arrangements

which resulted in her not being able to testify.

Due to the irregularities of her attorney, Petitioner Hall was forced to appear before Judge Mathers in order to place on record her Motion for a New Trial, irregularities by her attorney and her Notice of Appeal if necessary.

Because she was forced to appear on her own behalf against her doctors wishes, the new bone that was forming washed away, prolonging her illness, making another bone graft necessary, and subjecting her to possible amputation of her right arm.

The Petitioner only learned after the trial from Camoscio that Judge Lawton a subpoenaed witness was a friend of attorney Ferullo. Judge Lawton never testified because after he received his subpoena he chose to have elective surgery. Judge Mathers excused

Judge Lawton from the case knowing that his testimony was vital to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that affidavits written by the Petitioner were true.

The Boston Municipal Court Decision came down. Justice Glynn found that attorney St. Pierre, attorney Flynn and Richard Hall had altered the purchase and sales agreement on the marital home to cheat Camoscio out of his one half of the property, as ordered by Judge Murphy in Probate Court. To make matters worse attorney Flynn and Richard Hall lied to Judge George Sullivan sitting in Plymouth Superior Court when the results of Boston Municipal Court case came down stating that the marital home had not been sold this matter took place in front of Judge George Sullivan on November 6, 1987. These crooks deliberately did not tell Justice Sullivan that they had

made a deal and sold the home on October 26, 1987 just one week before. Because Judge Sullivan was told that the marital home was not sold, Judge Sullivan then placed a Summons and Restraining Order on the Marital Home forbidding Richard Hall to sell property on November 13, 1987. Judge Sullivan ordered attorney Flynn, Richard Hall and Frank Camoscio to appear in Plymouth Superior Court. Again Judge Sullivan asked the status of the marital home, again attorney Flynn and Richard Hall stated that the marital home was not sold. Judge Sullivan then ordered and placed on record a Preliminary Injunction to be placed on property in both Probate Court and with the Registry of Deeds and ordered Camoscio and attorney Flynn to deliver to Judge Lawton a copy of this Preliminary Injunction not to sell or divide the

marital assets. Judge Sullivan then according to Judge Glynn's Decision in Boston Municipal Court enforced the Complaint in Equity for Fraud and Deceit. One week later Judge Lawton knowing that a Preliminary Injunction was imposed on the marital home and its assets conspired with attorney Flynn, Richard Hall and the Conways to sell the Marital Home and its Assets when this property had already been sold illegially on October 26, 1987. This made Judge Lawton part of the fraud committed on the court and should have been forced to testify when under subpoena as to why he broke a Court Order and conspired to commit a felony against Camoscio and Frances Hall. Judge Mathers knew of this fraud and this is why I believe he made those statements at the onset of the trial against Camoscio, "I've heard about you. I don't like you. I don't trust you.

You are a liar". Judge Mathers I believe was covering Judge Lawton's ass and he then became part of this crime against the Petitioner and especially against Camoscio. Justice Mathers knew that Lawton had committed a crime. See Appendix I for Judge George Sullivans Court Orders, and see Appendix J Judge Lawton's November 20, 1987 Court Order, Appendix K of the selling of Marital Home by attorney Flynn and Richard Hall to the Conways with the Preliminary Injunction filed both in the Probate Court handed to Judge Lawton in person and also filed with the Registry of Deeds, Appendix L, Boston Municipal Court Decision by Judge Theodore Glynn, and Appendix G, Bill of Sale, Frances M. Hall selling her half of Marital Home according to Judge Murphy's Probate Court Order to Frank J. Camoscio.

Judge Mathers stated during the trial that the case against the Petitioner Hall was terribly remote. Meaning there was no case against Frances Hall. The Petitioner quotes volume III page 30 of the transcript of the trial:

"Mrs. Hall seems to me to be terribly remote to these proceedings". (Volume III page 30 of Transcript.) Judge Mathers also stopped Camoscio from filing copies of these court orders proving that fraud was committed by the sale of the property to the Conways by Judge Lawton, attorney Flynn and Richard Hall.

The jury asked only one question of the judge during their deliberations which Judge Mathers misinformed the jury allowing them to believe that the Petitioner Frances M. Hall was part of the original case Frank J. Camoscio v. John E. Conway, when in reality the

Judge knew he had on file in the court records a copy of the original complaint proving that Frances Hall was not a party to Camoscio's case against Conway. This document was part of the court records which was deliberately depleted by Judge Mathers for the jury to inspect. Judge Mathers knew if the jury saw this document they would drop all charges against the Petitioner and find against the Conway's, and prove that Judge Lawton committed a crime.

The Petitioner then filed an Appeal outlining all of these wrong doings but the Court chose not to act because if the court found in the Petitioner's favor then action would be taken against Judge Lawton, Judge Prince and Judge Mathers.

The Petitioner then filed for Further Appellate Review which was denied.

The Petitioner then received a copy of Camoscio's Motion To Set Aside Judgment first in Superior Court then in the Appeals Court. Due to this motion since it affects the last decision and judgment the Petitioner could not file a Writ of Certiorari until it was acted upon.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

I. The court erred by not granting the Petitioner Hall absolute immunity.

The Petitioner Hall should have been granted absolute immunity because the only statements that the Respondents are complaining about are those contained in affidavits in Camoscio v. Conway. Hall was not a party to these proceedings nor benefitted financially from any outcome of the case. Hall was only a witness in these proceedings.

Under common law principle, Hall is entitled to absolute immunity. The The Petitioner cites the following cases: Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E. 2d 356, Aborn v. Lipson (1970) 256 N.E. 2d 442, 357 Mass. 71, "Words spoken by a witness in the course of judicial proceedings are ab-

solutely privileged, if pertinent to the proceedings, even if uttered maliciously or in bad faith, and words 'pertinent to proceedings' are not to be construed narrowly." and Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc. (1978) 373 N.E. 2d 215, 374 Mass. 528, "Absolute privilege of an attorney to publish false and defamatory matter in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding applies only where proceeding is contemplated in good faith and is under serious consideration."

II. The court erred by not granting summary judgment.

Frances Hall filed for summary judgment arguing that the Respondents failed to show one statement which Frances Hall made that was false. Even the depositions by both Respondents

prove that neither could quote under oath any alleged statement because it did not exist. In their amended complaint, the Respondents claimed that it was the Petitioner and co-defendant who circulated these alleged statements that interfered with the sale of the property to the Mendoncas, but, according to affidavits and testimony, it was the Conways' own employee Douglas Purdy who had circulated these statements. See Transcript volume I, page 44.

Frances Hall also supplied an affidavit to the court declaring that all the statements she made to the court were true and accurate in Camoscio v. Conway. The Respondents offered no proofs to contradict Frances Hall's affidavit or motion for summary judgment. The Petitioner cites Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231 § 91 which allows the court to find in the Petitioner's

favor because truth is Petitioner Hall's answer to the plaintiff's complaint. The court had to grant summary judgment in Hall's favor because the Respondents could not show one false statement made by Hall and Hall stated that every statement in question was true. Under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231 § 91, the Respondents had a duty to tell Petitioner Hall what statements she made that were false fourteen days prior to the trial. The Respondents did not because there were never any false statements made by Petitioner Hall. A motion was filed by Camoscio at the onset of the trial demanding the court instruct the Respondents to inform the Petitioner and co-defendant what statements the Respondents were claiming to be false as required by Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231 § 91. Judge Mathers denied the motion violating the law.

III. Petitioner Hall was denied due process.

Petitioner Hall was in no physical condition to testify and participate in her own defense at the trial. Due to a previous automobile accident which resulted in multiple orthopaedic injuries caused Hall to be confined to bed under heavy medications, Class II and Class III substances which mentally impaired the Petitioner.

Through attorney Ferullo Petitioner Hall asked the court for a sixty day extension of time because she wanted to testify and participate in her own defense. Judge Mathers denied Hall's request. Attached to her motion was a letter from Dr. Drew which stated that she could only be out of bed for one to two hours. Since Hall lived in Somerville, one to two hours would be used

up in just transporting her to and from the court. Judge Mathers refused to allow the Petitioner any recess time to transport Hall to the court to testify on her own behalf. See Transcript volume III, page 44 and volume II pages 170-172. This action by Judge Mathers denied Petitioner Hall due process because she was denied the right to testify on her own behalf when Judge Mathers refused her attorney a recess in order to transport Frances Hall and minimize her time out of bed to prevent any further complications from her previous injuries.

Secondly, due process was violated when Judge Mathers refused to enforce subpoenas concerning Patricia Conway and the Mendoncas. Petitioner Hall had a right to question Patricia Conway since she had signed a verified complaint. Hall also needed the

Mendoncas' testimony to prove that she never circulated any statement which interfered with the sale of the property.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Hall is guaranteed the right to be heard in a meaningful manner which means that she is entitled to be able to testify, face her accusers, and present favorable arguments and evidence. Judge Mathers made it impossible for her to testify as indicated by the Transcript. Judge Mathers had a duty to postpone the trial until Frances Hall was well enough to testify on her own behalf free from medication which could possibly cloud her mental judgment and memory.

Petitioner cites the following cases: Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Authority, 503 F. Supp. 610, adhered to 90 F.R.D. 62, affirmed 678 F. 2d 919, certiorari denied 103 S. Ct.

302, "In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14." and Craig v. Carson, 449 F. Supp. 385, "Fundamental indispensable protections of procedural due process are hearing before impartial decision maker after adequate notice of reason for deprivation with opportunity for individual to present his case. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14."

Due to Judge Mathers denying Hall to be heard in a meaningful manner she was unable to make an affirmative defense which the jury could have found in her favor. Judge Mathers himself stated: "Mrs. Hall seems to me to be terribly romote to these proceedings." (volume III page 30 of Transcript) Also, note that the jury was instructed

on weighing privilege by the Petitioner proving that the statements were true and accurate. Since the court refused to make any arrangements for Hall to be heard, this act violated due process. See volume III, page 111 of Transcript. The jury even questioned Hall's participation in Camoscio v. Conway and asked the court if they could see the complaint. Judge Mathers could not comply because it was not introduced at the trial. See volume III, pages 114 and 115 of Transcript.

The counsel who represented Hall wanted to withdraw from the case when he learned that a dear friend Judge Lawton was going to be called as a witness. However, Judge Mathers refused to allow Ferullo to withdraw from the case and he continued to represent Hall, Ferullo failed to question witnesses presented by the Respondents raising the issue of

his effectiveness as an attorney. Eight days later after the trial was over, he notified Hall by constable that he had lost the case. Hall then filed a motion on her own behalf for a new trial because she felt she was denied justice. This motion stated the irregularities of Ferullo, including his trying to convince her to make a deal with the Respondents and failing to protect her right of being able to appear as a witness at her trial.

With all these violations of due process, Hall is entitled to a new trial.

IV. The court cannot enforce judgment and judgment must be set aside due to fraud under Rule 9(b) and (e) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.

Both fraud 9(b) and intentionally

biased judgement 9(e) exists in this case.

The Petitioner therefore denies the authority of this court to assess damages or to enforce its flawed order for the Respondents.

The Petitioner demands review and re-trial before an impartial court to remedy the effect which the fraudulent acts inflicted by Respondents and to counter-act judicial malice.

The Respondents and his representatives lied and continue to lie to perpetrate and protect the fraud.

SPECIFICATIONS

In a divorce action, Probate Court ordered Frances Hall and Richard Hall to sell their residential real estate.

The Halls -- with Mr. Hall's at-

torney Flynn -- and Dr. Frank J. Camoscio executed a purchase and sale agreement to sell both halves of the real property to Camoscio; taking a deposit from Dr. Camoscio and, subsequently, Mrs. Hall accepted full payment for her half of the property and executed a bill of sale to Dr. Camoscio.

Within the same week, Atty. Flynn signed another purchase and sale agreement for the same property to the Dwyers, knowing that he was committing fraud. This purchase and sale agreement is part of the Probate Court records.

With the help of Mrs. Hall's attorney -- Carolyn St. Pierre -- Richard Hall altered his copy of the purchase and sale agreement. Atty. St. Pierre moved in with Mr. Hall and later married him while still claiming to represent Mrs. Hall.

Eventually, Richard Hall used the altered purchase and sale agreement to sell the entire property through the Conway agency.

Meanwhile, Boston Municipal Court decision affirmed that the purchase and sale agreement to Camoscio had been tampered with by Mr. Hall. Judge Byron ordered that Hall be brought to trial; to date the court has conveniently overlooked this order.

During the Probate proceedings, it was found that Hall used an unlicensed firearm to threaten Mrs. Hall. No action under the mandatory gun law was taken against Hall; in fact the gun was returned to him by the Pembroke police.

Then Hall and St. Pierre, with the protective representation of State Representative Flynn, conspired to sell the property with agent Conway. The sale

took place on October 27, 1987.

In the meantime, action was taken by the original buyer to safeguard the property. There was a restraining order issued by Judge George Sullivan in Plymouth Superior Court preventing the sale. Judge Sullivan sent Camoscio and Flynn to deliver the restraining order to the Registry of Deeds and to Probate Court where Judge Lawton accepted it in hand. Hence, on November 3, 1987, Flynn swore before Judge George Sullivan that the property had not been sold. He lied, knowing the sale was illegal.

On November 13, again Camoscio, Flynn and Hall appeared before Judge Sullivan. Flynn and Hall Swore that the property had not been sold and that the status was the same. Flynn and Hall both well knew that the property had been sold on October 27 and that the deed was turned over to Conway as owner,

not merely as agent.

Then Conway brought Camoscio into court saying that Camoscio prevented the sale to Conway's client the Mendoncas. Conway claimed they were prevented from getting a mortgage because of Camoscio's claim. However, the Mendoncas were seeking funds from a Mortgage Company owned by Conway, and since Conway knew of the fraud, his claim has no merit. The damage that arose was solely caused by the Respondents and as a rule of law they had a legal duty to mitigate such damage, therefore their claim is invalid.

When Conway's claim went to court, further fraud was committed by Justice Mathers who was obligated to protect Judge Lawton and Atty. Flynn. There is no question that Judge Lawton lied to protect the fraud. There is no question that Flynn lied to further the fraud.

Justice Mathers refused to even consider Camoscio's evidence; and he made prejudical statements about Camoscio. Mathers erred -- and intentionally abused his powers -- by refusing to allow evidence of a valid bill of sale to Camoscio, by refusing to allow a court decision that proved Hall and St. Pierre had altered the original purchase and sale agreement, even refused to allow Camoscio to mention any of the parties against him, refused to enforce subpoenas, and, when challenged for his admitted bias, he refused to step down. He held Camoscio in contempt; yet has never addressed the issue, and had the action stricken from the record. Mathers threatened Camoscio and refused to allow him to ask questions. Mathers knowingly allowed Atty. Sullivan to lie about Mrs. Hall, saying she was party to the suit

against Conway when he knew full well she was not. The case against Conway was brought only by Camoscio and was part of the record in this case.

Mathers charged the jury improperly. He even lied to the jury because he knew that the deposition from Mrs. Conway (who was not allowed to testify) proved Camoscio's case.

By not enforcing the subpoenas after agreeing that he would, Mathers obstructed justice by denying Camoscio's right to present testimony or to directly face the people who brought the charges against Camoscio.

To further insult Camoscio, Mathers ordered that Camoscio pay over 5 times the cost for case transcripts -- Atty. Sullivan paid only $379 and Camoscio was charged an illegal $2,000.00. This proves the prejudice of the court against the Petitioner who was a

co-defendant with Camoscio.

During the trial, Mrs. Hall was bedridden for bone graft surgery and ambulance service was scheduled to bring her to court. However, Mathers knowingly terminated the hearing the day before she was scheduled to appear.

Mathers demonstrated during the trial that he knew Flynn and Conway and Sullivan were lying, yet he allowed their statements to become record. He denied Camoscio the right to mention even the most basic facts: that there was a court order preventing the sale, that Flynn lied to Judge Sullivan about the sale, that Lawton willingly conspired to overlook the injunction against the sale. The judge denied Camoscio the right to place these court orders on record or question the Respondents witnesses concerning these court orders. He stopped Camoscio from

asking questions concerning them.

In preparing for the trial Judge Prince denied Camoscio's right of discovery, and allowed only one hour with the Respondents for depositions. Judge Prince denied the Petitioner any discovery including depositions, and interrogatories. He clearly denied the Petitioners right of due process and equal treatment under the law.

Mrs. Conway's deposition, for example, showed that although she charged slander in her suit, her deposed testimony proved she knew nothing about the claim and knew nothing about any of the charges she made.

Because Judge Mathers later even refused Camoscio's right to question Mrs. Conway about her deposition, he knowingly obstructed justice and allowed the fraud to be concealed from the jury.

Judge Lawton, in an attempt to cover his wrong doing, claimed there was a motion to claim coercion and threats against the Petitioner in the original sale. Lawton later admitted there was no motion yet he created an order to appoint a guardian for Mrs. Hall. Mrs. Hall demonstrated her ability to act for herself, proved there was no such motion and Lawton sidestepped his play. However, he illegally transferred funds to pay his personally appointed "guardian".

INVOCATION

Now Camoscio's funds have been mis-applied and fraudulently converted by Judge Lawton, and transferred by Judge Lawton prior to appeals adjudication in the face of gross judicial misconduct.

I Frances M. Hall invoke Rule 9;

specifically 9(b) and 9(e) and hereby state that I unoquivocally refuse to pay the false claims arrived at in and through fraud by the claimants and their manservants in fraud on the bench, even if it means incarceration to gain an impartial trial.

I refuse to allow funds which I received in good faith for the property in question to be converted illegally and distributed to claims gained through fraud and deceit.

I refuse to allow judgments by Lawton and Mathers which were obviously and intentionally flawed to my detriment go unchallenged.

In further support of my right of claim, specification, and invocation under Rule 9 (9(b) and 9(e)) I include in the record to be adjudicated at any future trial resulting from my declared refusals, the following motivation and

merits to be impartially heard.

MOTIVATION AND MERITS

It is clear that the motivation for the judicial bias and for the wrong doing in this case centers on Camoscio's branded status in the courts.

There is no doubt that Camoscio is an easy target for anyone who would take advantage of him -- St. Pierre, Hall, Conway, Flynn et al have demonstrated repeatedly that they willingly take advantage of Camoscio's subjugation to "the Irwin Order".

Judges Lawton and Mathers likewise abuse Camoscio and willingly allow the judicial beaurocracy to deny Camoscio due process and fair treatment.

Yet their motivation is based in communication outside the merits of this case and without judicial knowledge of

the merits of earlier cases which led to "The Irwin Order".

Because "The Irwin Order" has been specifically cited in this case, and because the bias has been openly linked to the brand placed on Camoscio, Rule 9 thereby requires a comprehensive review of the Motivation and Merits that operate to deny Camoscio a fair and impartial trial in this case.

In 1965, John E. Powers, then president of the Massachusetts Senate -- before Frank J. Camoscio, Attorney General Edward Brooke and First Assistant Attorney General Willy Davis -- stated to Camoscio that he (Powers) would "Get even with you, you bastard".

Brooke told Powers that he could never again run for Statewide office and, to escape prosecution before a grand jury for issuing a fraudulent license to Anne Hunnicut to practice podiatric med-

icine, promised to abide by the agreement.

Since 1965, Powers has made good his threat against Camoscio.

His insidious manipulation of the judicial beaurocracy in his safe role as Chief clerk has served to punish Camoscio for revealing Power's original crime. As the abuse of Camoscio snowballed, Camoscio became branded as a "kook" and an easy target. The result is that Camoscio's right to equal access to the courts has been abridged.

When Dr. Camoscio again revealed -- in the Fleming case -- illegal licenses being issued, Camoscio became the target of prosecution. (See Judges decision in Camoscio's favor, case #99221 Suffolk Superior Court) Appendix M.

A grand jury was called, and even though then Assistant Attorney General

Irwin fought against it, 35 indictments were handed down.

However, Attorney General Bellotti squelched the indictments and, to date, they have not been served.

Irwin's reward, of course, was to become Judge Irwin.

Meanwhile, Bellotti and his legal staff fought for 8 years to restore the illegal license to Fleming.

And, with equal vigor, they fought to ruin Camoscio. They, with the complicity of the Board of Registration in Podiatry, brought charges in interlocutory proceedings to deprive Camoscio of his license to practice and his livelihood.

Pursuant to these cases -- and as a matter of record -- Camoscio was physically attacked and his attorney was warned and threatened by Attorney General Bellotti to abandon Camoscio.

(See motion still awaiting action by Justice Joseph Nolan in the Supreme Judicial Court.)

Because those actions were resolved against Camoscio in interlocutory proceedings which are controlled by the Attorney General and because the Attorney General also represents the Board of Registration, Camoscio's case -- in all its beaurocratic complexity -- has never been heard on its merits in a court of law.

When Camoscio has tried to have individual incidents and his combined case heard, he has been blocked by the beaurocracy. Ultimately, Irwin favored his benefactors by Issuing "The Irwin Order" used in this case to benefit Conway.

Therefore, No action can go forward in the assessment of damages until

Rule 9 has been fully satisfied as to The judgemental bias, the fraud, and the motivation behind this case.

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner Hall is entitled to absolute immunity because the complained about statements were made in Camoscio v. Conway. The doctrine of claims preclusion prevents the Respondents from seeking any other damage they are entitled to except through the case Camoscio v. Conway. The court should have granted summary judgment because Hall stated that all statements made in the affidavits were true. The Respondents could not produce one statement made by Hall that was false. Under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231 § 91 the Respondents had a duty to inform the Petitioner about any alleged false statements that were the central issue in the case.

Hall's right of due process was violated when the court refused to

postpone the trial so that she could participate in her own defense and give testimony on her own behalf as well as to produce favorable witnesses, including Patricia Conway and the Mendoncas. There was no need for an immediate trial because this act violated Hall's right of due process which means the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

Under Rule 9 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure the Petitioner produced proofs that fraud was committed upon the court by the Respondents. Under this Rule judgment must be set aside. There is no question that the property was sold to the Conway's violating an injunction and the assets distributed by Judge Lawton. This violated a court order. There is no question that Richard Hall, attorney Flynn and attorney St. Pierre altered a purchase

and sales agreement as proven by Judge Glynn's Decision in Boston Municipal Court. Why should the Petitioner pay when the Respondents and their friends have committed the crime and fraud upon the court.

I hereby certify that all of the above statements are true and are made under the pains and penalties of perjury.

Respectfully submitted,

Frances M. Hall

Frances M. Hall
Pro Se
Counsel of Record
for Petitioner

58 Mount Vernon Street
Somerville, Massachusetts 02145
(617) 628-1744

Attorney for Petitioner

DATED: November 25, 1992

Domenic Bruno
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires April 29, 1998

Domenic Bruno
11/25/92

(2)

FILED
NOV 27 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

92-1117

No. _____

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

FRANCES M. HALL, ET AL.

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN E. CONWAY, ET AL.

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

* * * *

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

* * * *

FRANCES M. HALL
58 Mount Vernon Street
Somerville, Massachusetts 02145
(617) 628-1744
Counsel of Record

Attorney for Petitioner
Pro Se

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY ET AL, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO ET AL, Defendant(s)

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

This action came on for trial before the court and a jury, C.A. MATHERS, J. presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict,

APPENDIX "A"

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

(that the plaintiffs ..JOHN E. &... ..PATRICIA A. CONWAY.. recover of the defendants .FRANK J. CAMOSCIO & FRANCES M. HALL... the sum of $.42,500.00....., with interest thereon from .SEPT. 7, 1988 in the sum of $.12,170.14...as provided by law, and ~~his~~, ~~her~~, THEIR costs of action.)

(that the plaintiff.....take nothing, that the action be dismissed onthe merits, and that the defendant..... .....recover of the plaintiff..... ....his, her, costs of action.)

Dated at.BROCKTON....,Massachusetts, this ..25th..... day of .JANUARY., 1991.

ASSISTANT CLERK

DOCKETED: FEBRUARY 11, 1991

cc: WLS, ALF, FJC, FMH
2/11/91
k

Form 10 1M-6-85-RP

Signed by: Assistant Clerk,

John B. Deady

Amended Copy

(Above words Amended Copy hand written in by the State's Appeals Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

91-P-797

JOHN E. CONWAY & another[1]

vs.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO & another[2]

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER UNDER RULE 1:28

The defendants appeal from a Superior Court jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs $42,500 for intentional interference with the plaintiffs' purchase and sale agreement with third parties regarding real estate in Pembroke (the locus).[3] We affirm.

The defendant Hall had refused to assent to a sale of the locus as part

of the division of assets pursuant to a Probate Court divorce judgment (Tr. I:38-39, 41-42, 76; III:53; Exh. at 102, 103). The plaintiffs obtained title to the locus on October 26, 1987, by deed from Hall's husband as approved by the Probate Court (S.A. 4, 8; Exh. at 31, 102-103), with Hall's share of the sale

---

1/ Patricia A. Conway.

2/ Frances M. Hall.

3/ The denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment brings nothing before this court for review. Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 118, 126 (1986). Although Camoscio purported to appeal from a contempt order and the denial of his motion for a new trial (A. 705), he has not briefed these issues and we deem them to be waived. Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). See

Fergione v. Minuteman Regional Vocational Technical Sch. Dist., 396 Mass. 1015, 1015 n.4 (1986).

---

proceeds being deposited into court (A. 761-762; Tr. I:41-42).

The gist of the plaintiffs' complaint in the present action was that the defendants, acting in bad faith, insisted that the defendant Camoscio owned title to the locus when they knew otherwise, and acted in furtherance of Camoscio's litigation against the plaintiffs whereby he asserted his claim of title. [4] The defendant Hall continued to claim that she had conveyed title to her interest in the locus to Camoscio (A. 342) without evidence of any recorded instrument of conveyance (Tr. I:39-40).

1. Camoscio's appeal. We find no merit in the claim of privilege. The

jury properly could have found Camoscio's litigation against the plaintiffs wrongful in that Camoscio "[did] not have probable cause to believe the suit [would] succeed, and [was] acting primarily for a purpose other than that of properly adjudicating his claims." G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 410 Mass. 262, 273, 274-275 (1991). At the very least, the jury would have been warranted in finding that Camoscio's appeal in that litigation was frivolous, see Camoscio v. Conway, supra note 4 and that the appeal

---

[4] In that case, a Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and dismissed Camoscio's complaint on grounds of claim preclusion (S.A. 4, 17-19). On appeal, we summarily affirmed the judgment for

the plaintiffs with double costs and awarded them counsel fees in the amount of $1,000 (S.A. 4, 20-22). Camoscio v. Conway, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (1988).

---

precipitated the failure of the plaintiffs' agreement to sell (see A. 630-631; Exh. at 12-13). [5]

2. Hall's appeal. For reasons discussed in part 1 of this memorandum, we find that Hall did not establish any privilege. For all that appears, the issue of whether Hall was party to Camoscio's litigation against the plaintiffs was submitted to the jury without objection (Tr. III:114-115). There was evidence to support a finding that she was (Tr. I:43-44; II:105, 111). Apart from that evidence, however, there was evidence that she continued to maintain without support that she had conveyed her interest in the locus to Camoscio

despite adjudications to the contrary. The jury properly could have found that she acted in bad faith.

Finally, the record does not support Hall's argument that she was denied due process because the judge did not afford her the time or opportunity to so appear (Tr. II:169-172; III:21, 28-29, 32-33). Contrast Botsaris v. Botsaris, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 255-257 (1988). Neither her counsel nor Camoscio objected to her absence (Tr. III:76-77, 85). There was no error. See

---

[5] Camoscio claims error in certain comments made by the trial judge during a bench conference (Tr. II:90). The comments were unfortunate and uncalled for, but Camoscio has not demonstrated that the jury was affected or that he suffered any prejudice thereby. Compare

Gleason v. Source Perrier, S.A., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 561, 571-572 & n.17 (1990). See Rosenthal v. Weckstein, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 944, 946-947 (1985).

Homsi v. C.H. Babb Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 475-476 (1980).

The plaintiffs have requested an award of counsel fees and costs in connection with this appeal. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 400 Mass. 272 (1987); Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 19 (1989). See also Olmstead v. Murphy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 666 (1986). We consider the defendants' appeal to be frivolous. [6] Within thirty days after the issuance of the rescript, see Mass. R.A.P. 23, 367 Mass. 921-922 (1975), the plaintiffs may file with this court a motion for counsel fees and expenses in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, supra

at 20. Upon receipt of these materials, the defendant will be given a reasonable time to respond in writing. Ibid. This court will then establish the amount of appellate counsel fees to be included in the judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Dreben, Fine, & Greenberg, JJ.),

Clerk

Entered: January 31, 1992.

---

[6] See Greenberg, Sanctions: In Search of Standards, 74 Mass.L.Rev. 155, 167 (1990).

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

1412 Courthouse,

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

(617) 725-8055

TO: Frances M. Hall
58 Mount Vernon Street
Winter Hill MA 02145

RE: Docket No. FAR-06020

JOHN E. CONWAY & another vs. FRANK J. CAMOSCIO & another

NOTICE OF DENIAL OF F.A.R. APPLICATION

Please take note that on February 26, 1992, the above-captioned Application for Further Appellate Review was denied.

APPENDIX "C"

Jean M. Kennett, Clerk

Dated: February 26, 1992

To: Walter L. Sullivan, Esquire
Frank J. Camoscio
Frances M. Hall

APPENDIX "C"

TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

PLYMOUTH, SS. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 88-1677-B

JOHN E. CONWAY AND PATRICIA A. CONWAY,

Plaintiff(s)

VS.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO AND FRANCES M. HALL,

Defendant(s)

ORDER OF NOTICE

April 3, 1992

In the matter of Defendants' motion to set aside Judgment

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' give notice to said Plaintiffs' and their Attorney

to appear before our said Court, at the Court House in Brockton, in the Coun-

APPENDIX "D"

ty of Plymouth on Tuesday the Fourteenth day of April A.D. 1992 at 2 o'clock in the P.M., by serving him/her an attested copy of this order and a copy of said Motion, forthwith, that he/she may then and there show cause, if any there be, why said Motion should not be granted.

By the Court,

CLERK

Signed by: Francis R. Powers, Clerk.

4/14/92 (Chernoff, J.) No action taken. These motions have been stricken from the docket per orders of Mathers, R.A.J., issued on 4/7 & 4/14/92.
Attest: John B. Deady, Asst. Clerk

Hand written and signed by Assistant Clerk, John B. Deady on April 14, 1992.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS -

APPEALS COURT

CASE NO. A.C.-91-P-797

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS, APPELLANTS,

V.

JOHN E. CONWAY, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE APPEALS COURT'S JUDGMENT

The Defendant Frank J. Camoscio moves under the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 2 and Rule 15 that the court consider and act on this motion because Judge Mathers has refused the Defendant the right to file motions as allowed by the Massa-

chusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Mathers has written a court order removing motions from the records and barring the clerk from accepting any filing unless approved by him. The judge has adopted this policy in order to stop the Defendant from overturning the jury's decision based on the fact that the judge had wrongly instructed the jury and the damages complained about by the Plaintiff were self-created solely for the purpose to sue the Defendants.

The Defendant attaches copies of these motions which he filed or attempted to file with the court. These motions should have been filed and have been part of the lower court record because the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure gives the Defendant this mechanism of redress through Rule 60 and Rule 9. The state legislature, through its wisdom, gave Superior Court

the power to overturn a decision if the moving party can show that judgment violates a principle of law or it was based on some type of fraud. See Massachusetts General Laws chapter 214 § 1.

The Defendant raised the point in his special pleading that the damages sought by the Plaintiff were self-made. The principle of law states that the Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate the damages. Attached to the Plaintiff's motion were two cases citing this rule of law by the Supreme Judicial Court. Also, attached to this special pleading was a copy of the Plaintiff's amended verified complaint. This complaint was attached because the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants had circulated malicious statements concerning the Plaintiffs' title to the property. The complaint further alleges that this act resulted in the damages to the Plain-

tiff because a potential buyer could not obtain a mortgage. See paragraphs 9 and 11 of this complaint. Also, attached to the special pleadings was an affidavit by attorney Brilhante which stated that the alleged statements were circulated by Conways' agents and not the Defendants. Also, attached were pages from the transcript in which the Plaintiff admitted that it was his company that refused to give the mortgage which resulted in the damage. In conclusion, the Plaintiffs are entitled to no damages because they were self-created.

PRAYERS

1. The Defendant prays that judgment be set aside because the damages were self-created by the Plaintiffs.

I hereby certify that all of the above statements are true and are made under the pains and penalties of perjury.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Special Pleadings and Affidavits which were reviewed by Judge Mathers and denied the Defendant the right to file and argue these points on April 14, 1992.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

Signed by: Frank J. Camoscio.

DATED: April 21, 1992.

APPEALS COURT

~~Allowed~~ Denied

Dreben, Fine & Greenberg JJ.

Date: 7-9-92

ATTEST:

Assistant Clerk

Signed by: Assistant Clerk,

Andrew P. Quigley.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frank J. Camoscio, hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the within MOTION TO SET ASIDE APPEALS COURT'S JUDGMENT, by mail, postage prepaid, to Walter L. Sullivan, 28 Hazel Avenue, Scituate, MA 02066, and to Frances M. Hall, 58 Mount Vernon Street, Somerville, MA 02145.

Subscribed this 21st day of April 1992, under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

DATED: April 21, 1992.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, SS. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
NO. CA88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY AND
PATRICIA A. CONWAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO AND
FRANCES M. HALL,
Defendants.

SPECIAL PLEADINGS FOR FRAUD

UNDER RULE 9 OF MRCP

The Defendant Frank J. Camoscio asks that judgment be set aside under Rule 9, Rule 60, and MGL chapter 214 § 1 because the Plaintiffs have committed perjury upon the court in or-

der to obtain favorable judgment. The Defendant calls the court's attention to paragraph 9 of the Plaintiffs' Verified Amended Complaint which stated that the Defendants allegedly circulated false and defamatory statements concerning the Plaintiffs' title. The Plaintiff's agent was responsible for the circulation of these statements as proven by the affidavit of Gregory Brilhante. (See attached Affidavit by Gregory A. Brilhante dated February 26, 1990.)

In paragraph 11 of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the mortgage lender had refused to loan the Mendoncas money to buy the property because of these alleged statements. During the trial, the Plaintiff admitted that he was the mortgage lender described in paragraph 11 who had refused to give the Mendoncas a loan which

was the basis of his suit against Camoscio. (See attached transcript, pages 137 and 138 of Volume II Transcript of Evidence of Trial.) As a matter of law, the Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages. In this case, the plaintiff created the damages in order to sue the Defendants. The Defendant cites the following case: Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 428, 187 N.E. 2d 859, 863 (1963).

There is no question that the Plaintiffs had deliberately created the suit in order to abuse the Defendants. The Defendant, therefore, asks that judgment be set aside and damages be awarded to the Defendants for costs because this action is clearly an abuse of process. The Defendant points out that the Plaintiff had deliberately used the courts to extract money from the Defendants of which he was not en-

titled to receive. This case would not have existed if the Plaintiff had loaned the Mendoncas the money which he had refused to do as earlier promised.

PRAYERS

1. The Defendant prays that judgment be set aside and cost be awarded to the Defendant.

I hereby certify that all of the above statements are true and are made under the pains and penalties of perjury.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Amended Verified Complaint by the Plaintiffs.

2. Affidavit by Gregory A. Brilhante dated February 26, 1990.

3. Transcript of Evidence from Trial, pages 137 and 138.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

DATED: April 14, 1992.

Signed by: Frank J. Camoscio

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, SS. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
CA NO. 88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY)
AND PATRICIA A. CONWAY)
PLAINTIFFS)
)
VS.)
)
FRANK J. CAMOSCIO)
AND FRANCES M. HALL)
DEFENDANTS)

AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT

The parties and background

1. The Plaintiffs John E. Conway and Patricia A. Conway ("Conway") have a mailing address of 137 Washington Street, Norwell, MA 02061, and at all times material to the Complaint, were the owners of the real estate known as and numbered 30 Elm Street, Pembroke, MA ("Premises"), as more particularly described in deed dated October 26, 1987, recorded with Plymouth Deeds Book

8091, Page 111, a copy of which Deed is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A".

2. The Defendant Frank J. Camoscio ("Camoscio") resides at 252 Hanover Street, Boston, MA 02113, and was a named purchaser of the Premises in a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated March 11, 1988 ("Purchase Agreement") a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "B".

3. The Defendant Francis M. Hall, ("Hall") resides at 58 Mt. Vernon Street, Somerville, MA 02145, and is a former owner of the Premises, and a named Purchaser in the Purchase Agreement.

4. Camoscio, pro se, commenced a number of court actions, concerning the Purchase Agreement, one of which was

against Defendant Hall's former husband and joint owner, and which resulted in a judgment that the $1,500 deposit be returned, all as is more particularly indicated by the Findings, Judgment and Clerk's Certificate annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" ("BMC Action").

5. As a result of the BMC Judgment, in the action commenced against Conway by Camoscio, Conway's Motion for Summary Judgment was allowed, as is more particularly indicated in the Judgment annexed hereto as Exhibit "D" ("Plymouth Action") and the Appeals Court affirmation annexed hereto as Exhibit "D-1" ("Affirmation").

6. In connection with Hall's divorce action, the Premises were sold to Plaintiffs and Hall's share of the sale proceeds ($48,223.94) was deposited

in the Plymouth County Probate Court, as more particularly appears from the Order to Distribute Funds and Stipulation of Parties, copies of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit "E" ("Probate Action").

7. In connection with the BMC Action, Camoscio was represented by Attorney Paul Machado. In connection with the Probate Judgment, Hall was represented by the same Attorney.

Count I

Interference with Contractual Relationship

8. After Plaintiffs had purchased the premises, for $164,500, and expended $27,000.00 for repairs and improvements, and entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement to sell the Premises, Camoscio commenced the Plymouth Action, seeking

among other things, to specifically enforce the Purchase Agreement, notwithstanding the BMC action, (Exhibit "C").

9. After the Plaintiffs had purchased the premises, as indicated in allegation 8 above, knowing full well of the purchase by, and financial commitments of, Plaintiffs, Defendants, acting individually and in combination, unlawfully and maliciously published and circulated false and defamatory statements concerning Plaintiffs' title to the Premises, claiming that the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit "B") was in full force and effect, knowing full well that said Purchase Agreement was a nullity as a result of the BMC Action (Exhibit "C").

10. As a result of these unlawful and malicious statements, Camoscio

and Hall, individually and collectively, have interfered with an advantageous sale to Mr. & Mrs. Paul Mendonca ("Mendonca") as indicated in the Sale Agreement, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "F". Pursuant to said Agreement Plaintiffs would have received net proceeds on March 25, 1988 of $211,500, at a time when Plaintiffs' total investment was $191,500.

11. Mendonca's mortgage lender, having learned of Defendant's claims, refused to fund the purchase, and Mendonca terminated the sale agreement, causing Plaintiffs to incur additional carrying costs of approximately $40,000 until a sale of the premises on December 28, 1989 for net proceeds of approximately $200,000. Consequently, the Plaintiffs' adjusted net loss from the ultimate sale was approximately $50,000

and lost profit from the Mendoca sale was approximately $18,000 for a total loss of $68,000.

12. On information and belief the $48,223.94 deposited in the Plymouth County Probate Court for the benefit of Hall, in connection with Plaintiffs' purchase, remains on deposit with said Court, together with interested accumulations.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray:

1. That the Court issue a temporary restraining order, restraining the Defendant Frances M. Hall from applying for or receiving the funds on deposit with the Plymouth County Probate Court, Case No. 85D 0970-D1.

2. That the Court issue a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Frances M. Hall from applying for or receiving the funds on deposit with the Plymouth Probate Court Case No. 85D-0870-D1.

3. That the Court issue a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Frances M. Hall from publishing and circulating statements denying Plaintiffs' title to the Premises at 30 Elm Street, Pembroke, MA.

4. That the Court issue a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Frank J. Camoscio from publishing and circulating statements denying Plaintiffs' title to the Premises at 30 Elm Street, Pembroke, MA.

5. That a hearing be held in or-

der to determine the $68,000 of money damages sustained by the Plaintiffs as a result of the conduct of the Defendants.

6. That the Plaintiffs be allowed their costs and expenses, including Attorneys' fees and for such other and further relief as the circumstances may require.

The Plaintiffs John E. Conway and Patricia A. Conway, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say that we are the Plaintiffs in the within action, that we have read the amended Complaint and know the contents thereof to be true, except as to those matters therein stated on information and belief, as to which we believe the same to be true.

John E. Conway

Patricia A. Conway

Signed by: John E. Conway and Patricia A. Conway.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, SS. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY ET AL)
PLAINTIFFS)
)
VS.)
)
FRANK J. CAMOSCIO ET AL)
DEFENDANTS)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now comes Gregory A. Brilhante, an attorney with offices at 321 N. Main Street, Box 2568, Fall River, MA, and on oath do depose and say as follows:

1. I represented Paul D. Mendonca and Mary Ann Mendonca (collectively "Mendonca") in connection with their efforts to purchase the premises at 30 Elm

Street, Pembroke, MA ("Premises").

2. In connection with said representation, I am aware that the Mendoncas were prepared to close on the transaction on March 25, 1988 at a price of $218,000 in accordance with the terms and conditions of the March 2, 1988 purchase and sale agreement, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit A.

3. On or about March 18, 1988, I was advised by the attorney for the mortgage lender of the action commenced by Frank J. Camoscio ("CA88-0482"). After consultation with the Mendoncas and further conferences with the Bank attorney indicating that title insurance with affirmative assurance was not available, the closing date was extended for 30 days in order to "clear title". During the extension period, I inquired from

time to time of the Sellers' trial counsel to determine the status of the litigation and he provided me with copies of the pleadings, motions and affidavits on file at the Court.

4. By document dated May 9, 1988 the closing date was extended in connection with a use and occupation agreement through November 8, 1988, "to clear title" with the right reserved in Mendonca to extent the same. From time to time thereafter, I conferred with, and reviewed the materials submitted by, Sellers' trial counsel.

5. On or about October 6, 1988, Camoscio having taken an appeal to the Appeals Court, Mendonca gave notice of their intention to terminate the Purchase and Sale and Use and Occupation Agreement. Consistent with said notice,

the Mendoncas vacated the premises and made other arrangements for their housing requirements.

6. Based upon a review of the file the Mendoncas were ready, willing and able to purchase the premises at the contract price of $218,000 on March 25, 1988 and I have reason to believe that they continued to be so ready, willing and able through the date of their notice of termination, if CA88-0482 had been finally disposed of, to the satisfaction of the title insuror and the mortgagee bank.

Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 26th day of February, 1990.

Gregory A. Brilhante

Before me

Notary Public Catherine P. Fox

My Commission Expires: 5/8/92

Signed by: Gregory A. Brilhante and

Catherine P. Fox

Q That is your Complaint, isn't it, sir?

A I haven't read it yet.

(Whereupon, the witness perused the document.)

A It's my signature at the end, yes, it's mine.

Q Weren't both these documents sworn to?

A Yes.

Q Then why did the altered purchase and sale agreement with Camoscio, dated 3-11-86, contain both Frances and Robert and Richard Hall's signature?

MR. SULLIVAN: Object.

THE COURT: Excluded.

Q According to paragraph 11 of this sworn statement, you refer to the Mendoncas hav-

ing trouble getting a loan from their mortgage lender since Camoscio filed suit against you, is that true?

A Wait 'til I read paragraph 11 and I'll comment.

(Whereupon, the witness perused the document.)

A That is true.

Q Was it Northern Mortgage Company the lender referred to in this paragraph?

A To the best of my recollection, it was.

Q Aren't you Northern Mortgage Company?

A I am. Well, I am a stockholder in Northern Mortgage Company.

Q Are there any other stockholders?

A Yes.

Q How many?

A Three.

Q Who are they?

MR. SULLIVAN: Object.

THE COURT: Excluded.

Q Are you Chairman of the Board of that company?

A Yes.

Q Mr. Conway, then why would you not want to loan the money to Mendonca if you knew there were no problems with the title?

MR. SULLIVAN: Object.

THE COURT: Excluded.

Q Are you familiar with this purchase and sale agreement, sir?

A I'm familiar with the form. It's a purchase and

sale agreement of Hall to Babbitt. dated June 29, 1987

Q I'm just asking if you are familiar with it?

A The answer is yes.

Q Okay. Isn't it true that you had to wait until Babbitt signed a release form on August the 21st before you could enter into a purchase and sale agreement with Richard Hall?

THE COURT: Excluded.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frank J. Camoscio, Defendant, hereby certify that on this 14th day of April, 1992, I mailed, postage prepaid, SPECIAL PLEADINGS FOR FRAUD UNDER RULE 9 OF MRCP, to Walter L. Sullivan, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 28 Hazel Avenue, Scituate, MA 02066, and to Frances M. Hall, 58 Mount Vernon Street, Somerville, MA 02145.

Subscribed this 14th day of April 1992, under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

Signed by: Frank J. Camoscio

QUARANTO v. SILVERMAN

Cite as 187 N.E.2d 859

John J. QUARANTO et al.

v.

Samuel SILVERMAN.

Supreme Judicial Court

of Massachusetts.

Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 4, 1962.

Decided Feb. 7, 1963.

10. Damages ⇐62(1)

A party claiming injury by tort has a duty to use reasonable means to minimize his damages.

Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284, 288. Brian v. B. Sopkin & Sons, Inc., 314 Mass. 180, 183, 49 N.E.2d 894, and cases cited.

A party claiming injury by a tort has a duty to use reasonable means to minimize his damages.

BRIAN et al. v. B. SOPKIN & SONS, Inc.

49 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Bristol.

June 28, 1943.

7. Damages ☞62(1)

A party injured by a tort has duty to use reasonable care to minimize damages.

[7,8] A party injured by a tort has a duty to use reasonable care to minimize the damages. Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284, 288; Eastman v. Sanborn, 3 Allen 594, 81 Am.Dec. 677; Atwood v. Boston Forwarding & Transfer Co., 185 Mass. 557, 71 N.E. 72; Ingraham v. Pullman Co., 190 Mass. 33, 76 N.E. 237; Sullivan v. Old Colony Street Railway, 200 Mass. 303, 309, 86 N.E. 511; Fairfield v. Salem, 213 Mass. 296, 100 N.E. 542; Gray v. Boston Elevated Railway, 215 Mass. 143, 147, 102 N.E. 71.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, SS. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
NO. CA88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY AND
PATRICIA A. CONWAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO AND
FRANCES M. HALL,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Frank J. Camoscio, hereby depose and swear to the following facts which document events and actions by parties to this case who have committed fraud upon the court. Because Case findings have been based upon fraud and deceit, and because the proofs of fraud and deceit

are a matter of record; all court decisions subsequent to the frauds are null and void as a matter of law.

In the matter before the court, as the court of original jurisdiction, the existence of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud is clearly demonstrated.

Camoscio agreed to purchase the subject real estate from Richard Hall and Frances Hall. The Halls were instructed to sell the property by Probate Court.

A valid purchase and sale agreement was executed by Camoscio, Hall. and Hall. A deposit was given to Mr. Hall and full payment was made to Mrs. Hall. This sale occurred before the Hall's divorce nici.

Mrs. Hall was represented by Atty. St. Pierre: but Mrs. Hall did not know at

this time that Mr. Hall and St. Pierre had a private relationship.

Richard Hall, with his Atty. Flynn and Atty. St. Pierre altered the original purchase and sale. See judgment by Boston Municipal Court in Camoscio's favor, finding that the original purchase and sale agreement was altered.

With the altered document, however, Richard Hall proceeded illegally to sell the property to Conway in October of 1987. Atty. Flynn participated in this illegal sale knowing full well that his client had altered a prior agreement.

Camoscio attempted to protect his prior status and ownership of the property before Judge George Sullivan in Superior Court in November of 1987.

In that hearing and under oath, Atty. Flynn lied to the court. Richard Hall lied to the court. They both stated to Judge Sullivan that the property had not been sold, knowing that they both had participated in an illegal transaction to sell the property in the previous month.

Judge Sullivan took their word, and issued a restraining order prohibiting the sale.

Ten days later, Flynn and Hall again appeared before Judge Sullivan and repeated their lies, stating that the property had not been sold.

Judge Sullivan then ordered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of the property. Judge Sullivan instructed Atty. Flynn and Camoscio to submit a

copy of the injunction to Judge Lawton sitting in Probate Court. Said injunction was served in hand.

Sullivan also instructed Flynn and Camoscio to file a copy of his order to be attached to the property title in the Registry of Deeds. This copy of the order was duly filed.

One week later, Judge Lawton -- at the request of atty. Flynn -- divided the Hall's assets of the marital home in defiance of Judge Sullivan's Order.

Camoscio sued Conway to claim his rightful ownership. Judge Steadman dismissed the case due to claims preclusion, stating that the case should have been heard in original action, either in Boston Municipal Court or Probate.

Conway then sued Camoscio for contract interference, using the legal terminology "Just Libel". The Law requires, however, that Camoscio's statements be proven false -- which is not the case -- and that Conway be the rightful owner -- which is also not the case.

At a pre-trial hearing before Judge Steadman on the Conway matter, the case was sent immediately to Judge Mathers for trial. No pre-trial hearing was held.

Within minutes, in front of Judge Mathers, the case was scheduled for trial. This was on a thursday, and the case was scheduled for the following tuesday, and the Monday was a holiday.

With only one court day to prepare, Camoscio was denied the right to sub-

poena witnesses. Further, he was blatantly denied the right to prove that subpoenas were served in hand. No right of discovery was allowed and no depositions could be taken.

On the trial day, Judge Mathers stated to Camoscio "I've heard of you. I don't like you. I don't trust you. You're a liar".

Camoscio appeared Pro Se, and Mathers denied him proper due process. Mathers demanded that Camoscio submit all questions to witnesses in writing in advance. Mathers promised to enforce subpoenas, but failed to do so.

Mathers refused to allow Camoscio to enter evidence of the bill of sale and of the fraud. Camoscio was held in contempt for mentioning the fraud, but the

contempt was deleted from the record.

Camoscio was denied the right to face his accusers, right to depositions, and all discovery. (Time for depositions was limited to one hour; witnesses took up the hour in meaningless responses.)

After manipulating the trial in further evidence of his bias against Camoscio, Judge Mathers wrongly instructed the jury.

1. Judge Mathers stated that Camoscio got back his money from Mr. Hall and that was the end of Mr. Camoscio claim for the property and that he was, therefore precluded. Page 102 volume III. Camoscio never paid, and Mathers knew this to be the case.

2. On page 100 lines 17-22 of the transcript, Judge Mathers tells jury that Camoscio and Hall were planning to purchase property from Hall's husband. Yet the truth is that Camoscio entered into a Purchase and Sales Agreement with both Halls and had paid for Frances Hall's half in full.

3. Page 100 lines 23-25 and page 101 lines 1-7 Judge states Camoscio only wanted money back in Boston Municipal Court, yet Mathers knew that the Truth is that Camoscio filed Motion to Amend complaint to enforce Purchase and Sales agreement but Boston Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction and told

Camoscio to file a Complaint in Equity for Fraud and Deceit in Superior Court upon winning and file a copy of this complaint in Probate Court.

Finally, Mathers openly lied to the jury on a fundamental point when the jury asked a major question during deliberation: "was Mrs. Hall part of the original court action in Camoscio v. Conway". Even when Camoscio objected, and even though case documents proved otherwise, Mathers insisted the jury be told a lie -- and stated that Mrs. Hall was part of Camoscio's original case against Conway, thereby asserting Hall and Camoscio were in collusion.

Since the Mathers trial was mishandled, Motions to Address fraud upon the court by both Camoscio and Mrs. Hall have

been filed, and obstructed.

Nowhere has this issue of fraud been addressed.

Finally, Probate Court ruled that Camoscio is the rightful owner which makes Conway's suit null and void. (See Judge Asack's Court Order)

Further, Camoscio's motion to prosecute the perpetrators for fraud upon the court has been granted, because the proofs and documentation are available to the court.

In the simple attempt to seek justice and to protect the original transaction, Camoscio has been subjected to wide-spread abuse. Mrs. Hall, who has acted only to keep her word and to uphold the original transaction, has only been

abused.

Throughout the entangled proceedings, a thread of abuse of power, complicity with the fraud, and cover-up of illegal acts has been woven by the court system and its beaurocracy.

Mrs. Hall's Atty. St. Pierre -- during the Hall divorce proceeding -- encouraged Mrs. Hall to leave the Marital home "for fear of her life", and to leave behind her personal belongings. St. Pierre, meanwhile, moved in with Mr. Hall (and subsequently married him), was found guilty of embezzlement in an unrelated matter (but held Camoscio responsible for not lying for her), participated with Mr. Hall and Flynn in altering the original purchase and sale agreement (and refused to comply with the Boston Municipal Court judgment),

and encouraged Mr. Hall to cooperate with Conway and his Atty. Walter Sullivan in their attempts to perfect the illegal second sale of the property.

Atty. Flynn and Mr. Hall were confronted with their fraud before Judge Lawton, in Probate Court. Rather than be held in Contempt by Judge Lawton, Flynn and Hall agreed to a trial in front of Judge Byron in Superior Court for Fraud and Deceit upon the Probate Court. Judge Byron demanded a trial by jury. (Flynn found it necessary to be represented, himself, at this hearing and brought in Senator Creedon.)

Judge Lawton granted title to the property to the Conways and persistently refused to honor all claims by Mrs. Hall and by Dr. Camoscio.

Lawton even went so far as to name a guardian ad litem for Mrs. Hall so he could over-ride her objections to the fraud. And when it was proven that the guardian was illegally imposed, Lawton still paid the guardian out of Mrs. Hall's funds.

Lawton committed fraud by his own actions when he knowingly defied Judge Sullivan's restraining order and protected Flynn, Hall, and Conway from prosecution.

All of these statements are true. The pattern of acts and the chain of events are a matter of record. Each and every statement made herein has been proved beyond doubt.

And the Abuse continues.

A. Judge Asack ruled on March 31, 1992 that Camoscio was rightful owner of the property and Camoscio should receive the property based on Original Purchase and Sale Agreement.

Judge Asack knew, during the hearings, that Boston Municipal Court ruled Richard Hall committed fraud and altered Purchase and Sale agreement.

B. A New Order by Judge Asack indicates this original order was "denied" but fails to give any reason for the mysterious reversal.

1. Judge Asack could not have reversed this order unless someone brought it to his

attention with illegal pressure, proving that the original order should stand since Asack acted outside the scope of his authority.

2. Camoscio appeared in Plymouth Superior Court on April 3, 1992 and received the allowed orders in hand. The same day, the motions which were allowed on March 31, 1992 were later marked "denied" on April 3, 1992.

3. The motion was denied concerning Protective Order, yet Judges note states just the opposite. Also, when the Judge denied a motion its printed not written and the hand writing does not

appear to be the same.
(Refer to letter D and
how letter i are dotted.)

Judge Asack intended to allow the Motion for protective order, which is clear from his instructional paragraph at the bottom of the motion, in the judges handwriting.

When someone in the judicial bureaucracy saw fit to alter this decision, they were too dumb to erase the judges instructional paragraph.

Clearly his order to allow the motion should stand. If the opposition succeeds in this further manipulation, the central issue of fraud will only await appeals to be resolved.

C. The Court cannot act one way

or the other until an evidentuary hearing is heard to resolve these issues.

SUMMARY

Judgment should be set aside and a new trial be granted so the jury can decide these issues.

A. Judge Lawton was subpoenaed to appear before the jury but chose Elective Surgery to avoid telling the truth concerning his wrong doing in the property.

B. Judge Mathers denied me the right to present anything concerning the fraud involved in the property.

C. Judge Mathers wrongly instructed the jury, as noted above.

Court lacks jurisdiction to award judgment because Amended Verified Complaint is a perjured document.

A. Perjury is that the Plaintiffs stated that the Defendants diseminated libelous and false statements concerning the property which interfered with the sale.

1. Testimony proved it was John Conway's agents that circulated the statements.

B. If perjury exists in the Complaint the Court lacks jurisdiction to offer them any money.

I hereby certify that all of the above statements are true and are made under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

DATED: April 14, 1992.

Signed by: Frank J. Camoscio.

Domenic Bruno
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires May 29. 1992

4/14/92

Notary Public signed by: Domenic Bruno.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frank J. Camoscio, hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the within AFFIDAVIT, by hand, to Walter L. Sullivan of 28 Hazel Avenue, Scituate, MA 02066, and to Frances M. Hall, 58 Mount Vernon Street, Somerville, MA 02145.

Subscribed this 14th day of April 1992, under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

DATED: April 14, 1992.

Signed by: Frank J. Camoscio

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
No. 88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY AND
PATRICIA A. CONWAY,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO AND
FRANCES M. HALL,
Defendants.

SPECIAL PLEADING UNDER RULE 9

Both fraud 9(b) and intentionally biased judgement 9(e) exists in this case.

Defendant therefore denies the authority of this court to assess damages or to enforce its flawed order for the plaintiff.

Defendant demands review and re-trial before an impartial court to remedy the effect which the fraudulent acts inflicted by plaintiff and to counter-act judicial malice.

The plaintiff and his representatives lied and continue to lie to perpetrate and protect the fraud.

SPECIFICATIONS

In a divorce action, Probate Court ordered Frances Hall and Richard Hall to sell their residential real estate.

The Halls -- with Mr. Hall's attorney Flynn -- and Dr. Frank J. Camoscio executed a purchase and sale agreement to sell both halves of the real property to Camoscio; taking a deposit from Dr.

Camoscio and, subsequently, Mrs. Hall accepted full payment for her half of the property and executed a bill of sale to Dr. Camoscio.

Within the same week, Atty. Flynn signed another purchase and sale agreement for the same property to the Dwyers, knowing that he was committing fraud. This purchase and sale agreement is part of the Probate Court records.

With the help of Mrs. Hall's attorney -- Carolyn St. Pierre -- Richard Hall altered his copy of the purchase and sale agreement. Atty. St. Pierre moved in with Mr. Hall and later married him while still claiming to represent Mrs. Hall.

Eventually, Richard Hall used the attered purchase and sale agreement to

sell the entire property through the Conway agency.

Meanwhile, Boston Municipal Court decision affirmed that the purchase and sale agreement to Camoscio had been tampered with by Mr. Hall. Judge Byron ordered that Hall be brought to trial; to date the court has conveniently overlooked this order.

During the Probate proceedings, it was found that Hall used an unlicensed firearm to threaten Mrs. Hall. No action under the mandatory gun law was taken against Hall; in fact the gun was returned to him by the Pembroke police.

Then Hall and St. Pierre, with the protective representation of State Representative Flynn, conspired to sell the property with agent Conway. The sale

took place on October 27, 1987.

In the meantime, action was taken by the original buyer to safeguard the property. There was a restraining order issued by Judge George Sullivan in Plymouth Superior Court preventing the sale. Judge Sullivan sent Camoscio and Flynn to deliver the restraining order to the Registry of Deeds and to Probate Court where Judge Lawton accepted it in hand. Hence, on November 3, 1987, Flynn swore before Judge George Sullivan that the property had not been sold. He lied, knowing the sale was illegal.

On November 13, again Camoscio, Flynn and Hall appeared before Judge Sullivan. Flynn and Hall Swore that the property had not been sold and that the status was the same. Flynn and Hall both well knew that the property had been sold on

October 27 and that the deed was turned over to Conway as owner, not merely as agent.

Then Conway brought Camoscio into court saying that Camoscio prevented the sale to Conway's client the Mendoncas. Conway claimed they were prevented from getting a mortgage because of Camoscio's claim. However, the Mendoncas were seeking funds from a Mortgage Company owned by Conway, and since Conway knew of the fraud, his claim has no merit.

When Conway's claim went to court, further fraud was committed by Justice Mathers who was obligated to protect Judge Lawton and Atty. Flynn. There is no question that Judge Lawton lied to protect the fraud. There is no question that Flynn lied to further the fraud.

Justice Mathers refused to even consider Camoscio's evidence; and he made prejudical statements about Camoscio. Mathers erred -- and intentionally abused his powers -- by refusing to allow evidence of a valid bill of sale to Camoscio, by refusing to allow a court decision that proved Hall and St. Pierre had altered the original purchase and sale agreement, even refused to allow Camoscio to mention any of the parties against him, refused to enforce subpoenas, and, when challenged for his admitted bias, he refused to step down. He held Camoscio in contempt; yet has never addressed the issue, and had the action stricken from the record. Mathers threatened Camoscio and refused to allow him to ask questions. Mathers knowingly allowed Atty. Sullivan to lie about Mrs. Hall, saying she was party to the suit against Conway when he knew full well

she was not. The case against Conway was brought only by Camoscio and was part of the record in this case.

Mathers charged the jury improperly. He even lied to the jury because he knew that the deposition from Mrs. Conway (who was not allowed to testify) proved Camoscio's case.

By not enforcing the subpoenas after agreeing that he would, Mathers obstructed justice by denying Camoscio's right to present testimony or to directly face the people who brought the charges against Camoscio.

To further insult Camoscio, Mathers ordered that Camoscio pay over 5 times the cost for case transcripts -- Atty. Sullivan paid only $379 and Camoscio was charged an illegal $2,000.00.

During the trial, Mrs. Hall was bedridden for bone graft surgery and ambulance service was scheduled to bring her to court. However, Mathers knowingly terminated the hearing the day before she was scheduled to appear.

Mathers demonstrated during the trial that he knew Flynn and Conway and Sullivan were lying, yet he allowed their statements to become record. He denied Camoscio the right to mention even the most basic facts: that there was a court order preventing the sale, that Flynn lied to Judge Sullivan about the sale, that Lawton willingly conspired to overlook the injunction against the sale.

In preparing for the trial Judge Prince denied Camoscio's right of discovery, and allowed only one hour with the

plaintiffs for depositions. Prince also denied all use of interrogatories. He clearly denied Camoscio's right of due process and equal treatment under the law.

Mrs. Conway's deposition, for example, showed that although she charged slander in her suit, her deposed testimony proved she knew nothing about the claim and knew nothing about any of the charges she made.

Because Judge Mathers later even refused Camoscio's right to question Mrs. Conway about her deposition, he knowingly obstructed justice and allowed the fraud to be concealed from the jury.

Judge Lawton, in an attempt to cover his wrong doing, claimed there was a motion

to claim coercion and threats against Mrs. Hall in the original sale. Lawton later admitted there was no motion yet he created an order to appoint a guardian for Mrs. Hall. Mrs. Hall demonstrated her ability to act for herself, proved there was no such motion and Lawton sidestepped his play. However, he illegally transferred funds to pay his personally appointed "guardian".

INVOCATION

Now Camoscio's funds have been mis-applied and fraudulently converted by Judge Lawton, and transferred by Judge Lawton prior to appeals adjudication in the face of gross judicial misconduct.

I Frank J. Camoscio invoke Rule 9; specifically 9(b) and 9(e) and hereby state

that I unoquivocally refuse to pay the false claims arrived at in and through fraud by the claimants and their man-servants in fraud on the bench, even if it means incarceration to gain an impartial trial.

I refuse to allow funds which I paid in good faith for the property in question to be converted illegally and distributed to claims gained through fraud and deceit.

I refuse to allow judgements by Lawton and Mathers which were obviously and intentionally flawed to my detriment go unchallenged.

In further support of my right of claim, specification, and invocation under Rule 9 (9(b) and 9(e)) I include in the record to be adjudicated at any future

trial resulting from my declared refusals, the following motivation and merits to be impartially heard.

MOTIVATION AND MERITS

It is clear that the motivation for the judicial bias and for the wrong doing in this case centers on Camoscio's branded status in the courts.

There is no doubt that Camoscio is an easy target for anyone who would take advantage of him -- St. Pierre, Hall, Conway, Flynn et al have demonstrated repeatedly that they willingly take advantage of Camoscio's subjugation to "the Irwin Order".

Judges Lawton and Mathers likewise abuse Camoscio and willingly allow the

judicial beaurocracy to deny Camoscio due process and fair treatment.

Yet their motivation is based in communication outside the merits of this case and without judicial knowledge of the merits of earlier cases which led to "The Irwin Order".

Because "The Irwin Order" has been specifically cited in this case, and because the bias has been openly linked to the brand placed on Camoscio, Rule 9 thereby requires a comprehensive review of the Motivation and Merits that operate to deny Camoscio a fair and impartial trial in this case.

In 1965, John E. Powers, then president of the Senate -- before Frank J. Camoscio, Attorney General Edward Brooke and First Assistant Attorney

General Willy Davis -- stated to Camoscio that he (Powers) would "Get even with you, you bastard".

Brooke told Powers that he could never again run for Statewide office and, to escape prosecution before a grand jury for issuing a fraudulent license to Anne Hunnicut to practice podiatric medicine, promised to abide by the agreement.

Since 1965, Powers has made good his threat against Camoscio.

His insidious manipulation of the judicial beaurocracy in his safe role as Chief Clerk has served to punish Camoscio for revealing Power's original crime. As the abuse of Camoscio snowballed, Camoscio became branded as a "kook" and an easy target. The result

is that Camoscio's right to equal access to the courts has been abridged.

When Dr. Camoscio again revealed -- in the Fleming case -- illegal licenses being issued, Camoscio became the target of prosecution. (See Judges decision in Camoscio's favor, case # 99221 Suffolk Superior Court)

A grand jury was called, and even though then Assistant Attorney General Irwin fought against it, 35 indictments were handed down.

However, Attorney General Bellotti squelched the indictments and, to date, they have not been served.

Irwin's reward, of course, was to become Judge Irwin.

Meanwhile, Bellotti and his legal staff fought for 8 years to restore the illegal license to Fleming.

And, with equal vigor, they fought to ruin Camoscio. They, with the complicity of the Board of Registration in Podiatry, brought charges in interlocutory proceedings to deprive Camoscio of his license to practice and his livelihood.

Pursuant to these cases -- and as a matter of record -- Camoscio was physically attacked and his attorney was warned and threatened by Attorney General Bellotti to abandon Camoscio. (See motion still awaiting action by Justice Joseph Nolan in the Supreme Judicial Court.)

Because those actions were resolved

against Camoscio in interlocutory proceedings which are controlled by the Attorney General and because the Attorney General also represents the Board of Registration, Camoscio's case -- in all its beaurocratic complexity -- has never been heard on its merits in a court of law.

When Camoscio has tried to have individual incidents and his combined case heard, he has been blocked by the beaurocracy. Ultimately, Irwin favored his benefactors by Issuing "the Irwin Order" used to benefit Conway.

Therefore, No action can go forward in the assessment of damages until Rule 9 has been fully satisfied as to The judgemental bias, the fraud, and the motivation behind this case.

I hereby certify that all of the above statements are true and are made under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO
Pro Se
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 720-2849

DATED: April 14, 1992.

Signed by: Frank J. Camoscio.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, SS. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
NO. CA88-1677

JOHN E. CONWAY AND PATRICIA A. CONWAY, Plaintiff,	)
vs.	)
FRANK J. CAMOSCIO AND FRANCES M. HALL, Defendants.	)

AFFIDAVIT BY FRANCES HALL

I Frances Hall swear to the following statements.

Before our divorce nici, I and my then husband were instructed by judge Murphy in probate court to sell our Marital home.

I signed and Richard Hall (husband) signed a valid purchase and sale agreement with Dr. Frank Camoscio to sell the property.

Dr. Camoscio paid me in full for my half and I gave him a bill of sale. Dr. Camoscio paid Richard Hall a deposit for his half of the property.

Richard Hall and his Atty. Flynn then altered the purchase and sale agreement so they could sell my home to a real estate speculator, Conway.

The money from Conway, representing my half of this illegal second sale was held by the court and I stated that I could not honestly take money a second time, and that I knew the sale to Conway was fraudulent.

I have since cooperated with Dr. Camoscio to defend his rightful ownership.

It has been difficult enough for me to be attacked by the people committing the fraud to sell the property a second time. But I was even more shocked to experience Judge Lawton's participation in the matter.

He has gone out of his way to protect Flynn and Conway and to deny me my rights.

He even went so far as to try to assign a guardian ad litem to me who could take over and act in my behalf. I successfully prevented him from doing so, but he still misappropriated funds and paid the guardian anyway.

I hereby certify that all of the above statements are true and are made under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANCES M. HALL
Pro Se
58 Mount Vernon Street
Somerville, Massachusetts 02145
Telephone (617) 628-1744

DATED: April 14, 1992.

Domenic Bruno
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires May 29, 1992

4/14/92

Affidavit signed by: Frances M. Hall.

Notary Public signed by: Domenic Bruno.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frances M. Hall, hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the within AFFIDAVIT, by hand, to Walter L. Sullivan of 28 Hazel Avenue, Scituate, MA 02066, and to Frank J. Camoscio, 252 Hanover Street, Boston, MA 02113.

Subscribed this 14th day of April, 1992 under the pains and penalties of perjury.

FRANCES M. HALL
Pro Se
58 Mount Vernon Street
Somerville, Massachusetts 02113
Telephone (617) 628-1744

DATED: April 14, 1992.

Signed by: Frances M. Hall.

MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS,

CHAPTER 231 § 91.

EFFECT OF UNPROVED DEFENSE OF TRUTH IN ACTION OF SLANDER OR LIBEL; PROOF OF STATEMENTS NOT CONTAINED IN PLEADINGS

In an action of slander or libel, if the defendant alleges that the words spoken or published were true, such allegation, although not supported by the evidence, shall not of itself be proof of the malice alleged in the complaint, nor shall statements of the defendant differing in import from those alleged be admissible to establish his malice unless such statements were published in pursuance of a general scheme to defame or otherwise injure the plaintiff. If the plaintiff proposes to introduce evidence of statements of the defendant

other than those contained in his pleadings, he shall give the defendant written notice of such intention, specifying the date and content of each such statement, at least fourteen days before trial begins, or earlier if the court so orders; and, if any such statement is introduced in evidence, the defendant shall be permitted to prove that it was true, or was privileged, or any other facts relating thereto which tend to negative malice.

Amended by St. 1943, c. 365, § 1; St. 1973, c. 1114, § 192.

MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 9 (b) and (e)

PLEADIND SPECIAL MATTERS

(b) FRAUD, MISTAKE, DURESS, UNDUE INFLUENCE, CONDITION OF THE MIND. In all averments of fraud, mistake, duress or undue influence, the circumstances constituting fraud, mistake, duress or undue influence shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.

(e) JUDGMENT. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS

that FRANCES M. HALL

in consideration of $ 67,267.10

paid by FRANK J. CAMOSCIO

the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby grant, sell, transfer and deliver unto the said FRANK J. CAMOSCIO. . . the following goods and chattels, namely:

MY COMPLETE HALF SHARE IN THE PROPERTY AT 30 ELM STREET, PEMBROKE, MASSACHUSETTS. WITH ALL ENCUMBRANCES and LIENS IF-ANY.

To have and to hold all and singu-

iar the said goods and chattels to the said FRANK J. CAMOSCIO

and his executors, administrators, and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever.

And that I hereby covenant with the grantee that I AM the lawful owner ½ of the said goods and chattels that I have good right to sell the same as aforesaid; and that I will Warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.

In witness whereof the said FRANCES M. HALL

hereunto set her hand and seal this 12th day of APRIL in the year one thousand nine hundred and EIGHTY SIX

Signed and sealed in presence of

FRANCES M. HALL

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO

Signed by: Frances M. Hall and
Frank J. Camoscio.

DAVID J. GAGNON, NOTARY-SUFFOLK
Commission Expires June 12, 1992

Notarized and signed by: David J. Gagnon.

DEACONESS SURGICAL ASSOCIATES

ORTHOPEDIC SERVICE

MICHAEL A. DREW, M.D.
Assistant Professor of
Orthopedic Surgery
Harvard Medical School

NEW ENGLAND DEACONESS HOSPITAL
110 FRANCIS STREET, SUITE 3B
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02215
(617) 732-9777

January 15, 1991

Brockton District Court

Brockton, MA 02402

RE: HALL, Frances

To Whom It May Concern:

Frances Hall is a patient who is being treated by this office for a nonunion of a fracture of her right humerus and for problems with her left knee. At the present time she is receiving med-

ication for this and in addition is being treated with an electrical stimulation device which she is required to wear throughout fourteen hours a day. As a consequence of both the medication and the treatment, for her to attend a trial for more than an hour or two a day would be medically contraindicated and a real hardship on this woman. I would expect that her condition would gradually improve to the point where she is able to attend hearings and a trial in approximately sixty days. I would very much appreciate any consideration you could give this lady.

If I can answer specific questions about her medical condition, please contact this office.

Sincerely yours,

Michael A. Drew, M.D.

MAD/PRO-MED:nlf

Signed by: Michael A. Drew, M.D.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH

CIVIL ACTION
NO. CA87-1908

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

RICHARD HALL, Defendant(s)

SUMMONS AND RESTRAINING ORDER

To the above-named Defendant :

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon Frank J. Camoscio, plaintiff whose address is 252 Hanover St., Boston, an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon

you, within 20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You are also required to file your answer to the complaint in the office of the Clerk of this Court at PLYMOUTH either before service upon plaintiff's attorney or within a reasonable time thereafter.

Unless otherwise provided by Rule 13(a), your answer must state as a counterclaim any claim which you may have against the plaintiff which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim or you will thereafter be barred from making such claim in any other action.

WE ALSO NOTIFY YOU that application has been made in said action, as appears in the complaint for a preliminary injunction and that a hearing upon such application will be held at the Court House at said PLYMOUTH in the first session without jury of our said Court on ..Friday..... the .....6th..... day of.November., A.D., 1987, at ..9:30.... o'clock A.M., at which you may appear and show cause why such application should not be granted.

In the meantime, until such hearing. WE COMMAND YOU, said defendant.., Richard Hall..... and your agents, attorneys and counsellors, and each and every one of them, to desist and refrain from ..transferring, selling... or otherwise disposing of the property located at 30 Elm Street, Pembroke....

Witness, THOMAS R. MORSE, JR., Esquire, at Plymouth, the ..fourth..... day of ..November..., in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven.

CLERK.

NOTES:

1. This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. When more than one defendant is involved, the names of all defendants should appear in the caption.

If a separate summons is used for each defendant, each should be addressed to the particular defendant.

Signed by: Clerk, Francis R. Powers.

Form 4 . 2M.6.78.RP

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

PLYMOUTH, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
No. CA87-1908

TO RICHARD HALL, of Pembroke,
County of Plymouth, defendant your,

Agents, Attorneys, and each and every
of them.

, GREETING:

WHEREAS, it has been represented unto
us, in our Superior Court, by
Frank J. Camoscio, of
Boston County of Suffolk

Plaintiff, that the, said Plaintiff, has
exhibited a Complaint in our said Court
against you, the said defendant
Richard Hall

wherein said Plaintiff, among other things, pray for a Preliminary Injunction against you, the said defendant:

Richard Hall

WE THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, do strictly enjoin and command you, the said Defendant, and all and every the persons before named, to desist and refrain from transfering, selling or otherwise disposing of the property located at 30 Elm Street, Pembroke, Ma.

until the further order of our said Court, or some Justice thereof.

Witness, THOMAS R. MORSE, JR., Esquire, at Plymouth, the thirteenth day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and

eighty-seven.

_____ Clerk.

Signed by: Clerk, Francis R. Powers.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

PLYMOUTH, SS

PROBATE & FAMILY
COURT, DEPARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT

RICHARD J. HALL, PLAINTIFF

V.

DOCKET NO. 85D0970

FRANCES M. HALL, DEFENDANT

AMENDED MOTION OF WILLIAM J. FLYNN, JR.
FOR PERMISSION TO DISTRIBUTE FUNDS

Now comes William J. Flynn, Jr. attorney for Plaintiff, Richard J. Hall and moves that this Honorable Court allow him to distribute $62,500.00 in funds that are in part Defendant's, Frances M. Hall's share from the proceeds of the sale of 30 Elm Street, Pembroke, Ma., Pursuant to a decree nisi in this case as follows:

1) &838,86 to Mark Fitzsimmons

Esq. as per order of this court.

2) &8,150.00 to Richard J. Hall as per decree nisi of this court, computed as follows; Defendant's share of maintenance of marital home at $500.00 per month from 7/1/86 - 10/31/87 or 16 months at $500.00 or $8,000.00 plus $150.00 to move personal belongings of Defendant's, Frances M. Hall.

3) $5,550.00 in counsel fees to William J. Flynn, Jr., attorney.

4) 47,961.14 to Defendant, Frances M. Hall.

_____

William J. Flynn, Jr.

Signed by: William J. Flynn, Jr..

Plymouth, ss. Probate Court

NOV 20 1987

The within motion is hereby allowed.

Justice of Probate and Family Court

Signed by: Justice James R. Lawton.

PROBATE & FAMILY COURT

FILED Nov. 20, 1987

PLYMOUTH DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Plymouth, ss Probate & Family Court
85D 0970 D1

Richard J. Hall

vs.

Frances M. Hall

ORDER TO DISTRIBUTE FUNDS

AS PER MOTION, PURSUANT

TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE

The parties are before the court on this date. Attorney William J. Flynn, Jr. of Hanover appears for the plaintiff, Richard J. Hall. Attorney Paul J. Machado of Fall River appears for the defendant Frances Hall. The parties had been before the court on Monday, November 16, 1987 on the mo-

tion of Attorney Flynn for a distribution of funds and for counsel fees for services rendered by him in this matter. The court advised Attorney Machado that it would be necessary for him to produce a detailed medical statement concerning the physical condition of the defendant Frances M. Hall, who is alleged to be seriously ill. The medical information is not presented to the court on this date, and although representations are made concerning her poor physical health, the court is satisfied that this matter should not be continued further.

The amended motion of Attorney William J. Flynn, Jr. for permission to distribute funds is herby allowed and the sum of approximately $62,500.00 held by him in escrow is to be distributed as set forth in said motion.

The sum of $62,500.00, which is the share of Frances M. Hall and the balance from the sale of the family home, shall be disbursed as ordered herein and shall occur on December 4, 1987 and in the event that the defendant, Frances M. Hall, refuses to accept those sums due her of approximately $47,961.14 said sum shall be deposited in the name of the First Justice of this court upon petition for leave to deposit said funds.

November 20, 1987

By the court:

James R. Lawton, First Justice
Probate & Family Court Dept.

Signed by: James R. Lawton, First Justice, Probate & Family Court Dept.

JRL:MLP

cc: Plaintiff, Defendant
Attorneys Flynn and Machado

I, RICHARD J. HALL

of Pembroke, Plymouth County, Massachusetts being unmarried, for consideration paid, and in full consideration of

$164,500.00

grant to John E. and Patricia A. Conway, husband and wife as tennants by the entirety both,

of 137 Washington Street, Norwell MA

with quitclaim covenants

[Description and encumbrances, if any]

A certain parcel of land with the buildings thereon and rights, improvements thereto belonging situated in Pembroke, Plymouth County, and being shown as Lot 2 on a plan entitled "Plan of Land in Pembroke, Henrich Development Trust - Owner" drawn by Malcolm T. Shaw, Registered Land Surveyor, dated June 7, 1963 recorder at Plymouth County Deeds

in Plan Book 12, page 1073 and bounded and described to said plan as follows:

Westerly By Elm street, 130 feet;

Northwesterly By the curved line forming the junction of Elm Street with a 40 foot way, twenty nine and 15/100 (29.15) feet;

Northerly By said 40 foot way, 232.88 feet;

Easterly By land of owners unindicated, 165 feet; and

Southerly By Lot 1 shown on said plan, 244.49 feet.

Said lot contains 40,000 square feet of land according to said plan.

For my title see deed from William H. Pedersen et ux, dated January 4, 1979, and recorded at Plymouth Registry of

Deeds in Book 4596, page 451. Also judgment of divorce Nisi dated July 1, 1986, and Plymouth probate order of May 6, 1987, both recorded at Plymouth Registry of Deeds, Book 7875, pages 200-201.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

CANCELLED

PLYMOUTH COUNTY

D E E D S

OCT27'87

STATE SEAL

E X C I S E

375.06

Witness my hand and seal this 26th day of October, 1987.

....

Richard J. Hall

....

....

Signed by: William J. Flynn, Jr. and
Richard J. Hall.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Plymouth, SS. October 26, 1987

Then personally appeared the above named Richard J. Hall and acknowledged the foregoing instrument to be his free act and deed, before me

.....

Notary Public ~~Justice of the Peace~~

Nathan J. Flynn

My commission expires May 7, 1993

Signed by: Nathan J. Flynn,
Notary Public.

(*Individual - Joint Tenants - Tenants in Common.)

REC'D OCT 27 1987 AT 11-15 AM AND RE-
CORDED

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

BOSTON MUNICIPAL COURT DEPARTMENT

CIVIL BUSINESS DIVISION

Suffolk, ss. Civil No. T-37953

FRANK CAMOSCIO
Plaintiff(s)

RICHARD HALL
Defendant(s)

FINDINGS OF THE COURT (REMAND)

The above-entitled matter was transferred to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston for trial under the provisions of Chapter 231, Section 102C General Laws (and amendments thereto). The parties have been notified to appear with their witnesses.

1. After hearing, the Court finds for

the plaintiff(s)..Frank Camoscio.....

and assesses damages in the sum of

$...1500^{00}.....

The court finds for the plaintiff Camoscio on the defendants Hall counter claim

2. ~~In the above-entitled action, Court finds for the defendant(s)~~.....

3. ~~Both parties having failed to appear, the Court orders the action dismissed.~~

.....

Entered..September..22..,19^{87}...

.....

Justice

Signed by: Justice Theodore A. Glynn.

Form 64

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

BOSTON MUNICIPAL COURT DEPARTMENT

CIVIL BUSINESS DIVISION

Suffolk, ss. Civil No. T-37953

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO.....
Plaintiff

RICHARD J. HALL.....
Defendant

Page # 1 of

ENTRY AND NOTICE OF

JUDGMENT ON FINDINGS BY THE COURT——

(FOR CLERK'S USE ONLY)

This action came on for hearing before the court,.....Glynn....,J., presiding, and the issues having been duly heard.

It is ordered and adjudged:

The Plaintiff.....

Recover of the Defendant.....

The Sum of.One Thousand Five.....

..Hundred and 00/100 ----------

Dollars($1,500.00), with interest

thereon from..January 27, 1987...,

as provided by law, with costs.

Dated at Boston, Massachusetts,

this.Twenty-Second.....day of

September...., 1987.....

Clerk/Magistrate

By.....

Assistant Clerk

Signed by: Clerk/Magistrate Michael J.

Coleman.

Signed by: Assistant Clerk John R. Cavanaugh.

JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET. September. 22.., 19.87. PURSUANT TO PROVISIONS OF RULE 58(a) AND NOTICE SENT TO PARTIES PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 77 (d).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

BOSTON MUNICIPAL COURT DEPARTMENT

CIVIL BUSINESS DIVISION

Suffolk, ss. Civil No. T-37953

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO.....
Plaintiff

RICHARD J. HALL.....
Defendant

Page #2 of

ENTRY AND NOTICE OF

JUDGMENT ON FINDINGS BY THE COURT

(FOR CLERK'S USE ONLY)

This action came on for hearing before the court,.....Glynn....,J., presiding, and the issues having been duly heard.

It is ordered and adjudged:

Judgment for Plaintiff Frank J. Camoscio on the Defendant's Counterclaim.

Clerk/Magistrate

By.....
Assistant Clerk

Signed by: Clerk/Magistrate Michael J. Coleman.

Signed by: Assistant Clerk John R. Cavanaugh.

JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET September 22, 1987 PURSUANT TO PROVISIONS OF RULE 58(a) AND NOTICE SENT TO PARTIES PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 77 (d).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
No. 99221

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO PLAINTIFF(S)

v.

BOARD OF REGISTRATION DEFENDANT(S)
IN PODIATRY

JUDGMENT ON FINDINGS BY THE COURT

THIS ACTION CAME ON FOR HEARING BEFORE THE COURT, DeGuglielmo, J., PRESIDING, AND THE ISSUES HAVING BEEN DULY HEARD AND FINDINGS HAVING BEEN DULY RENDERED; IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The decision of the respondent board be Annulled, and the matter be

remanded for rehearing within 90 days from the effective date of the Order.

DATED AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS,

THIS 22nd DAY OF Sept 1978

FORM OF JUDGMENT APPROVED:

MICHAEL JOSEPH DONOVAN,
CLERK OF COURT

_____ J.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

By: _____

ASSISTANT CLERK

Signed by: Kevin G. Murphy

Assistant Clerk.

Form Civ.P.34c (Rev.) 1-77 500

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Suffolk, ss. Superior Court
No. 99221

FRANK J. CAMOSCIO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THOMAS F. CONNOLLY, ROBERT A. SMITH, ANTHONY M. MAIELLA, WILLIAM B. GIADONE, HAMMOND I. BENDER, as they constitute the Board of Registration in Podiatry,
Defendants.

This is a petition brought under the provisions of G. L. c. 30A, S. 14 in which the Petitioner claims to be aggrieved by a decision, dated March 13, 1974, of the Respondent Board of Registration in Podiatry.

The case was submitted to the Court on a transcript of the record

consisting of 247 pages and three exhibits.

Factually, it appears that the petitioner and one Dr. Edward J. Fleming are engaged in the profession of podiatry. On December 29, 1973, the petitioner, by letter to the respondent, challenged, inter alia, the educational prerequisites (see G. L. c. 112, S. 14 & 16) of Dr. Fleming for registration under the Statutes of the Commonwealth. The Board, after investigation, held a hearing at which the petitioners and Dr. Fleming were invitated to attend together with counsel and witnesses.

On March 6, 1974, a hearing was held before respondent Board. The petitioners and Fleming with respective counsel were present and participated in the hearing. The petitioner and his witnesses testified and submitted exhibits. Dr. Fleming did not testify and

presented no evidence.

The Court recognizes that under the mandate of Berman v. Board of Registration of Medicine, 355 Mass. 358, the decision of the Board as to whether to hold a hearing is purely discretionary and beyond review by the Court. However, once that discretion is exercised and the Board determines to hold a hearing, that hearing must be conducted under the rules of judicial procedure as promulgated by G. L. c. 30A, S. 14.

I rule that the petitioner herein, having been called as complainant to testify at a hearing, was made a party to the matter here under Paragraph 8 of G. L. c. 30A, S. 14. The hearing, once granted, must, as a matter of law, be cloaked with the same requirement of fairness and justice which is demanded in all judicial

proceedings. All legislative prerequisites pertaining to the educational requirements of an applicant for registration in the field of podiatry as provided by G. L. c. 112, S. 16 must be met.

The sole issue for determination by the respondents was whether Dr. Fleming had those educational prerequisites for registration as a podiatrist. The Board made no effort to inquire of Dr. Fleming as to his educational qualifications. Instead the board spent its entire time interrogating the petitioner and his witness. Questions were asked and when the petitioner attempted to answer or explain, he was interrupted and silenced. The petitioner's past personal experiences with the respondent were exploited. Member of the Board indicated hostitity towards the petitioner. Private interviews between members

of the Board and witnesses outside of the hearing room and not under oath were considered by member of the Board in his individual decision. Despite the virtual autocracy of the various administrative Boards they are still required to maintain an aura of justice and fairness. An examination of the transcript clearly shows that this standard was not met by the members of the respondent board.

Further, the respondents have no power to waive the educational prerequisites to registrater as set forth by the Legislature. Chapter 112, S. 16. The Board has still to determine whether Dr. Fleming has or has not met the requirements of c. 211, S. 16.

The respondents filed 15 requests for rulings. I do not pass on Requests for Rulings 1-10 because they are requests for findings of fact. I grant Request 12, 13 and 14 as abstract propo-

sitions of law. With the exception of the last sentence in Request Number 16, which reads, "Dr. Comoscio failed to sustain his burden in this case," is granted. I deny Request for Rulings Numbers 11-15.

ORDER

On the basis of the foregoing, I order the decision of the respondent Board annulled and the matter remanded for rehearing within 90 days from the effective date of this order under the provisions of G. L. c. 30A, S. 14, Sub-sec. 8d, e, g, for re-hearing consistent with the requirements enumerated herein.

By the Court:

Joseph A. DeGuglielmo,
District Court Judge
Sitting in Superior Court

Entered: Sept. 22/78

Signed by: Judge Joseph A. DeGuglielmo.

SUPREME JUDICAL COURT

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

ROOM 1412 COURT HOUSE

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108

(617) 725-8055

STATE SEAL

JEAN M. KENNETH
Clerk

FREDERICK J. QUINLAN
Assistant Clerk

L. HOLLIEY WHITE
Assistant Clerk
Pro Tem

October 20, 1992

Mr. Frank J. Camoscio
252 Hanover Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02113

Dear Mr. Camoscio:

I return to you herewith your Petition for Equity.

I have been instructed by the justices not to accept it for filing. Justice Abrams takes no part in matters pre-

sented by you.

Very truly yours,

Clerk

Signed by: Jean M. Kenneth, Clerk,
Supreme Judicial Court for
the Commonwealth.